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Abstract 
Increasingly governments are looking to private sector actors to invest in infrastructure 
projects. An emergent mechanism for such investment is the market in PPP equity. 
This is an aspect of PPPs that has to date had little empirical attention. This paper 
reports on the size and scope of the market in PPP equity sales within the UK. In the 
process, the nature of PPP projects and the existing rationales for the policy are 
critiqued. The paper concludes by laying out a number of potential research agendas 
focused on PPP equity sales including a call for reassessing theoretical perspectives. 
Keywords 
Public Private Partnership (PPP); secondary market; equity sales; infrastructure 
investment funds. 
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1. Introduction 
The Westminster government recognises that infrastructure investment is essential for 
ensuring growth and development opportunities are distributed across the countries 
that comprise the United Kingdom (HM Treasury, 2014). In July 2015, the 
Conservative government revised and published a National Infrastructure Pipeline, 
stating it was underpinned by £411 billion of investment (HM Treasury, 2015). It is 
expected that the majority (up to sixty four percent) of this funding will come from 
private sources (HM Treasury, 2015) This approach results in government policy on 
infrastructure investment needing to be attractive to the private sector (Panayiotou and 
Medda, 2014; Hellowell et al., 2015). 
The main vehicle for this private sector investment remains the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI). The introduction of the PFI in the early 1990s was based on a series 
of justifications including the lack of available public capital funding due to political 
decisions, enhancing value for money, an ideological commitment to introducing 
private sector management techniques to the public sector and appropriate risk 
allocation for major construction projects (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; Wall and 
Connolly, 2009).  
These justifications have been critiqued during the intervening period, raising 
significant doubts over each one (see Andon, 2012; Pollock, 2004). However, Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs)1, as PFI has become known, is a dynamic policy where 
new and unexpected practices have developed. This paper explores one of these 
developing practices, the emergence of a market in PPP equity sales. This market is 
                                            
1
 In the main, the rest of this paper uses the acronym PPP to describe all three generations of the 
policy (PFI/PPP/PF2), as it is the most comprehensive and encompassing term of the three available. 
Private Finance 2 (PF2) is the name given to the rebranded (but fundamentally the same) policy 
under the UK Coalition government (2010-2015). 
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portrayed as a positive development for attracting more private sector investors (NAO, 
2012; Weber et al. 2016). In analyzing this development this paper addresses the call 
for more research into the underlying nature (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; 2004) 
and rationales (Andon, 2012; Spackman, 2002) of PPPs. 
WHXQGHUVWDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUH333Vµ«DVWKHSUHIHUHQFHIRUSULYDWHILQDQFHFRPSOH[
bundled contracts through a consortium and new accountability and governance 
DVVXPSWLRQV«¶+RGJHHWDO Such PPPs are constructed with their own 
Special Purpose Company (SPC)2 to undertake the design, construction, finance and 
operation of a public asset (such as a school or hospital). In the UK, the initial (primary) 
equity holders3 of the SPC are usually the construction company, bank (or financial 
institution) and the facilities management contractor. The SPC contracts with the 
public organization and finances construction predominantly through (senior) debt that 
accounts for 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the required finance. The remaining finance 
is provided by the equity shareholders in the SPC. It is this equity that is the focus of 
the analysis below, as it has given rise to the development of a secondary market 
(NAO, 2012). 
This is a new, emergent market with little work reported to date in academic journals. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to make an initial empirical contribution by focussing on 
equity sales in UK PPP projects between 1998 and 2016. This empirical contribution, 
as it is based on data drawn from disclosures and announcements by international 
SULYDWHVHFWRUSDUWQHUVDGGUHVVHVSDUWRI+RGJHDQG*UHYH¶V2018) contemporary 
                                            
2
 The term Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is often used in the academic and policy literature; 
however it is not appropriate for the purposes of this paper as the concern is on equity sales from 
SPCs. Further, the use of SPV can obfuscate the real nature of the relations involved with a PPP. 
3
 ³(TXLW\KROGHUV´LVWKHDSSURSULDWHWHUPWRXVHDVWKHWUDQVDFWLRQVUHSRUWHGLQWKLVSDSHUDUH
composed of both shares and sub-ordinate debt. However, when the transactions are reported the 
vendors do not disclose the breakdown between the shares and the debt. 
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research agenda focus on global PPP market actors. Further, the paper seeks to make 
a theoretical contribution by adding to the debate about the nature of PPP projects 
and the rationales used to justify the policy. We pay particular attention to those 
advanced by Spackman (2002) concerning the benefits of monitoring, long term 
commitment and ³whole life´ costing. This theoretical contribution addresses part of 
+RGJH DQG *UHYH¶V  FRQWHPSRUDU\ UHVHDUFK DJHQGD IRFXV on long-term 
complex contracts as governing regimes. 
The focus on equity transactions is justified because the development of this 
secondary market embeds the processes of financialization (and marketization) in 
SXEOLF LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DVVHWV 2¶1HLOO  7KLV KDV implications for ownership 
transparency, democratic accountability and value for money for the taxpayer (Smyth 
and Whitfield, 2017). There are also implications for the performance of PPP projects, 
as the design of appropriate performance measurement systems requires a clear 
understanding of the nature of the subject being measured. For example, is it 
appropriate to expect whole life costing or long term commitment from private sectors 
partners if they are potentially going to exit the project before six years, of a thirty year 
project, have elapsed (see section 4.1 below). 
There are (as yet unknown) potential impacts on service delivery as some PPP 
projects become majority or wholly owned by investment funds. Working from a 
neoclassical economics perspective, Weber et al. (2016: 306) note that the structure 
RI333VPXVWRIIHUHTXLW\LQYHVWRUVµDVXIILFLHQWO\DWWUDFWLYHULVN-return profile and in 
terms of governance, the opportunity to intervene in the project at an operational level¶
(emphasis added). Further, Gatti VWDWHV µLIDNH\SDUW\VHOOV LW VKDUHV LQ WKH639¶V
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FDSLWDO WR WKLUGSDUWLHV WKHQ WKHUH LV OHVV LQFHQWLYH IRU WKHSURMHFW WREHSHUIRUPLQJ¶
(2018: 267). 
The growth of (offshore) infrastructure funds also raises questions concerning tax 
avoidance and secrecy. This creates the conditions where excessive profit-making 
may occur and is difficult, if not impossible, to identify. All of these factors require 
future research and raise questions about how we have understood the nature ± 
merit and wRUWKWRXVH%URDGEHQWDQG/DXJKOLQ¶VIRUPXODWLRQ± of PPPs and 
whether existing theorizations are appropriate (Andon, 2012; Hodge and Greve, 
2008; Linder, 1999). 
This paper does not seek to address all of these issues focusing on the empirical and 
theoretical contributions stated earlier; however, these issues do provide the 
justification for a prolonged research engagement with PPP equity sales. The 
remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section locates equity sales 
within the broader PPP literature and identifies a burgeoning concern over the level of 
profit-making on these transactions. Section three explains the research design, while 
section four sets out the data on the PPP equity market. Section five returns to 
6SDFNPDQ¶V002) work and discusses it in the context of the data from the previous 
section. Finally, in section 6, the paper concludes with a reflection on the nature of 
PPPs given this emergent market and outlines possible future research projects. 
2. What do we know about PPP equity sales? 
The emergence of PPP equity transactions appears to have been unanticipated by 
researchers. The general PPP research themes identified by Broadbent and Laughlin 
(1999, 2004) contain concerns on regulation, processes aiding decisions to undertake 
PPPs, and ex post evaluations (Andon, 2012); all of which are applicable to this 
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secondary market even if equity sales are not specifically mentioned. Whitfield (2010) 
first outlined the scale of PPP equity sales transactions; raising concerns about the 
role of participants (including the many offshore infrastructure investment funds) in the 
market, and apparent levels of profiteering.   
While this paper reports the size and scope of the emergent PPP equity market in the 
UK, we also seek to understand its significance through the lens of our existing 
understandings of the nature (Boardman and Vining, 2012; Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1999; 2004) and rationales (Andon, 2012; Glaister, 1999; Spackman, 2002) for PPPs.  
Existing literature has sought to understand the manner in which PPP policy has 
evolved using various lenses, including PPP as management reforms, as problem 
conversion, as moral regeneration, as risk shifting, as restructuring public services, 
and as power sharing (Linder, 1999: Andon, 2012).  More specifically, Spackman 
(2002: 288-290) critiques the following five perceived financial benefits of using PPPs 
for governments: 
a. Easing macroeconomic constraints; 
b. Bypassing controls on public service investment; 
c. Evading formal constraints on borrowing or spending; 
d. Semi-privatisation of self-financing projects; 
e. Capital rationing as an instrument for change. 
Spackman (2002) finds these arguments unsatisfactory for a number of macro-
economic reasons, such as µliabilities to service PFI contracts are as binding as the 
servicing of conventional government debt¶ (p. 289); and, µprivate financing provides 
no extra resources at the national level¶ (p. 290). Spackman is not on his own in this 
regard. Writing in this journal Boardman and Vining (2012: 119) state: 
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most of the criteria explicitly or implicitly used by governments to justify the use of PPPs ± such 
DVGHIHUULQJH[SHQGLWXUHVSODFLQJH[SHQGLWXUHVµRII-EXGJHW¶µYDOXHIRUPRQH\¶DQGµRQWLPHDQG
RQEXGJHW¶± are either inadequate or just plain wrong. 
This leads Spackman (2002) to advance three alternative rationales for using private 
finance and partners in public infrastructure projects: 
First, monitoring requirements are likely to be more robust ... Second, contractors are tied to a 
longer-terPFDSLWDOLQYHVWPHQW7KLUG333VIRFXVSODQQLQJRQ³ZKROHOLIH´FRVWLQJ 
(Andon, 2012: 881- 882). 
In contrast, we contend that the manner in which the market in PPP equity transactions 
has emerged calls into question each of these three rationales.  
First, Spackman (2002) has a narrow view that contractor monitoring will be improved 
DVµprivate financiers may be stronger than those from the public sector clients under 
FRQYHQWLRQDO FRQWUDFWV¶ 6SDFNPDQ6SDFNPDQGRHVQRWH WKDW WKHUH LV
little empirical evidence capturing financiers¶ views on this; this remains the case 
nearly two decades later (Hodge and Greve, 2018), with Demirag et al. (2015) one 
notable exception. If we broaden the monitoring perspective to include ex post 
evaluations, there still remains little evidence available (Andon, 2012; Hodge and 
Greve, 2018). We would have to extend our interpretation of monitoring even further, 
and positing monitoring as a necessary element of regulation, before we get to a 
significant body of work that focuses on legislation, accounting policy, accountability 
and contracting arrangements (Andon, 2012).  
However, the studies Andon (2012) reviews do not address the emergent PPP equity 
market; while, Whitfield (2012) notes that there is a lack of regulation and oversight in 
the market. For example, the government auditor in England ± the National Audit 
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Office (NAO) ± has stated that most of what occurs in the secondary market is beyond 
their remit as it involves transactions between two private companies, even where the 
sole source of income for the SPC comes from public funds (NAO, 2012). 
Second, the emerging PPP equity market highlights, contra Spackman (2002), the 
lack of long-term commitment by primary investors. The market has developed to allow 
primary investors an exit route at an early stage (House of Lords, 2010). This is seen 
as a positive development that allows primary investors recycle their capital 
investments and make them available for future projects (NAO, 2012; Weber et al., 
2016). Further, an NAO report concluded that the development of the PPP equity 
market could lead to a reduction in the cost of equity in SPCs (NAO, 2012).  
Whether such capital recycling takes place is an open question; however, what is 
already known is that the primary investors are booking profits as well as liquidating 
their investments. For example the earliest identified PPP equity  transaction, in the 
UK, took place in June 1998 when Serco sold their thirty three per cent holding in the 
Defence Helicopter Flying School PFI4 to FR Aviation Ltd and Bristow Helicopter 
Group (ESSU, 2016). In their financial statements for 1998 Serco reported a £4.6 
million profit on this disposal. A HM Treasury report on the operation of PPP projects 
admitted there have been windfall gains made on equity sales (HM Treasury, 2012). 
To clarify, these gains on equity sales are different to the practice of refinancing gains 
on debt finance that is already established in the literature (Demirag et al., 2015; HM 
Treasury, 2006, 2007; Toms et al., 2011). µRefinancing is considered particularly 
                                            
4
 µ7KH*URXS¶VHTXLW\KROGLQJLQ)%6/LPLWHGZDVVROGRQ-XQHIRUDFDVKFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
RIZLWKDVVRFLDWHGGLVSRVDOFRVWVRI7KH*URXS¶VVKDUHRIWKHQHWOLDELOLWLHVRI)%6
Limited DWWKHGDWHRIGLVSRVDOZDVJHQHUDWLQJDSURILWRQVDOHRI¶6HUFR, 1998: 
39). 
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suitable for projects where the construction phase has been completed and the 
operational phase is demonstrably successful, which significantly reduces the risk 
profile of such projects and allows for revenues to be forecast more accurately¶ (Toms 
et al., 2011: 672). During the first two decades of the PPP policy gains from such 
refinancing were often excessive; for example, the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital PPP 
saw its investor rate of return nearly quadruple from 16.0 per cent to 60.0 per cent 
after refinancing took place two years into a thirty-year contract (HM Treasury, 2007; 
Toms et al. 2011). 
There are three points arising from the debt refinancing literature that are relevant to 
this paper¶VIRFXV on equity transactions; first, HM Treasury initially indicated support 
for refinancing gains accruing to the private sector partners on the basis that this will 
encourage greater private sector involvement in PPPs. This is the same argument that 
has been deployed by the government auditors (the NAO) in support of the 
development of the market in PPP equity transactions (see above).  
Second, there is a direct link between the weak regulation of the debt refinancing gains 
(Demirag et al., 2015; Toms et al. 2011) and the emergent equity transactions. The 
House of Commons¶ Public Accounts Committee has indicated that investors are 
µopting to defer refinancing in favour of realising gains through selling their shares in 
WKH VHFRQGDU\ HTXLW\ PDUNHWV¶ 3$&   Third, in assessing what the debt 
refinancing gains tell us about the nature and rationale of PPP projects, Toms et al. 
VWDWHµPDQ\3),UHILQDQFLQJGHDOVDSSHDUWRKDYHEHHQOLWWOHPRUHWKDQDYHKLFOHIRUD 
direct transfer of money from the public purse to the private investors, leading some 
SROLWLFLDQVWRUHIHUWRUHILQDQFLQJDVWKHXQDFFHSWDEOHIDFHRIFDSLWDOLVP¶
This point is relevant to our discussion below, where we posit that future research on 
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equity transactions, and PPPs more broadly, needs to adopt a political economy 
framing to establish the links between the PPP policy, (excessive) profit-making for 
private sector partners and the changes in the global economy and the form of capital 
accumulation over the past four decades (Arnold, 2009; Froud et al. 2000; Harvey, 
2005). 
$V WR 6SDFNPDQ¶V  Whird additional rationale, concerns about the benefits of 
whole life costing have already been identified in the extant literature; for example, 
µWKHUHLVDGDQJHURIORQJ-term PPP contracts tying an organization into a specific type 
RI WHFKQRORJ\ « UHGXFLQJ IOH[LELOLW\ DQG WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI QHZHU WHFKQRORJLHV¶
(McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010: 32). The liquidating and profit-taking process outlined 
in section 4 also brings into question the nature and benefits of whole life costing. 
Viewing PPP projects over their whole life, there are now two mechanisms through 
which private sector partners can extract additional (windfall) gains; via debt 
refinancing (as outlined above), and via the disposal of equity shares (as outlined later 
in this paper). While neither of these mechanisms may have been foreseen when the 
PPP policy was first formulated, they are now obvious to private sector contractors, 
changing their attitudes towards costs and revenues streams. Thus, primary investors 
become more concerned with a shortened horizon to the point where they can dispose 
of their equity and make a profit on it, rather than a long-term commitment. 
This section has discussed the research that analyses the nature of PPPs, from the 
perspective of equity transactions; noting that this is a new emergent market that 
challenges key rationales used to justify the policy. The next section explains the 
methodology adopted to gather the data reported on later; before presenting the data, 
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DIWHUZKLFKWKHGLVFXVVLRQUHWXUQVWR6SDFNPDQ¶VWKUHHDOWHUQDWLYHUDWLRQDOHV
for PPP policy, in light of the findings. 
3. Research design  
In the main, this research is based on a publicly available database5 that records PPP 
equity transactions reported by construction companies, banks and financial 
institutions, infrastructure funds and facilities management companies. The database 
was constructed by one of the co-authors from reports of actual sales/transfers of PPP 
equity. However, there were two significant obstacles in collecting this data. First is 
the fragmented nature of the announcements and disclosures. While, equity holders 
are supposed to give thirty days notice to their public sector partner of their intention 
to dispose of their shares, this does not have to be made public. Further, there is no 
oversight body responsible for enforcing disclosure or for recording these transactions. 
Hence, the data below was collected from a range of sources that include: 
x Stock exchange announcements/regulatory news service, company notices 
and  press releases;  
x Company interim and annual reports and accounts; 
x UK Companies Houses filings (and in Jersey and Guernsey); 
x Infrastructure investment fund prospectuses; 
x Construction and PPP company websites;  
x Former Partnerships UK Database;  
x HM Treasury PFI database; 
x Securities and Exchange Commission 8K filings for US companies; 
                                            
5
 The database is available free online at: https://www.european-services-strategy.org.uk/ppp-
database/ppp-equity-database 
. 
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x PPP, financial, construction and infrastructure trade journals. 
(based on Whitfield, 2012: 24). 
The second obstacle concerned a lack of transparency with regard to the contents of 
such announcements/disclosures. There is no prescribed format or information that 
should be disclosed. Therefore, often basic information such as cost, gains/losses 
made, and even price paid are omitted. This means that while every effort was made 
to prepare a comprehensive and accurate database, it is possible that inconsistencies 
are present and it is probable that many equity transactions have yet to be identified. 
It should be noted that similar difficulties, especially with regard to a lack of 
transparency, have been found by other researchers working on PPPs (e.g. Shaoul, 
2006). 
The database covers UK PPP equity sales from 1998 to the end of 2016. It contains 
462 transactions covering 1,003 PPP projects, with 118 transactions covering 334 
PPP projects disclosing gains/losses made. Drawing on the database entries, the 
ESSU (2016) estimates that 45 per cent of PPP projects (334) are between 50-100 
per cent owned by offshore infrastructure investment funds. 
On the accounting profits disclosed below, equity transactions may not be disclosed 
for up to a year after the transaction took place, when company annual reports are 
published. Further, it may not be possible to attribute the gain/loss to individual PPP 
projects when they are sold in a bundle, or where the transactions are not considered 
material in the context of a consolidated set of financial statements. Finally, the 
database does not record internal transfers, for example, between subsidiaries with 
the same group of companies. 
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The tables in the following section have been constructed from the data contained in 
the ESSU (2016) database (there was no sampling of this population). There are also 
two examples, to illustrate the impact of equity transactions on individual public 
infrastructure assets. These projects were chosen, not because they are currently 
typical, but because they illustrate the potential and likely future trends based on 
current government policy of encouraging investment in PPPs from institutional 
investors.   
4. Results and trends in PPP equity transactions 
We present the results of our analysis over three sub-sections ± the overall size and 
scope of the market, the growth of infrastructure funds and the gains reported when 
the equity transactions take place ± to give an overview of the emergent market and 
how it relates to the rationales discussed previously. 
4.1 Overall size and scope of the PPP equity market  
From 1998 to the economic crash in 2008 there was a steady increase in the number 
of equity transactions, the number of PPP projects covered by those transactions and 
the total annual value of the transactions. The economic crisis of 2007/8 had a short-
lived impact on each of these trends, with activity from 2011 starting to approach the 
pre-crash levels. Although it is too early to be definitive, the years 2015 and 2016 
appear to indicate a new trend where the actual number of transactions is decreasing 
but the value of equity being traded is increasing. This potentially reflects a 
concentration of shareholdings among a small number of market participants, due to 
the emergence of infrastructure investment funds (see 4.2 below).  
In reading Table 1 it is relevant to remember the lack of regulation of disclosures on 
equity transactions and the nature of the transactions themselves. First, with regard 
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to the number of equity transactions reported in columns 2 and 4, the difference is 
due to a lack of disclosure of the transaction value even though the transaction itself 
was disclosed. An example of this is the BBGI SICAV S.A. (Luxembourg) acquisition 
of 12.5 per cent of the equity in Mersey Care Mental Health Hospital PPP project, on 
24 July 2014. The Regulatory News Service (RNS) statement omitted to report the 
cost of the transaction from GB Partnerships Investments Limited which is not a 
public company and was therefore not required to issue a RNS (BBGI, 2014). 
Second, when transactions take place they often involve bundling equity from a 
number of PPP projects together in the one transaction; hence, the 462 transactions 
have involved over a thousand projects (some projects having part of their equity 
sold and re-sold several times). An example of this is the Balfour Beatty plc sale of 
its 80 per cent interest in five street lighting PFI projects to Equitix Limited (Tetragon 
Financial Group, Guernsey) for £33m (Balfour Beatty, 2016). The RNS did not name 
the five local authorities concerned. 
Using the numbers in Table 1 it is possible to estimate the value of the total equity 
traded in this market, from the 279 transactions where the price was disclosed. The 
monetary total of these 279 transactions was £6,411.3 million; giving a simple 
average of £22.9 million per equity transactions. Therefore, with a total population of 
462 transactions between 1998 and 2016, an estimate of the total value of this 
market is £10.6 billion. 
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Table 1: Annual rate and value of UK PPP equity transactions (1998-2016) 
Year No. of equity 
transactions 
No. of PPP 
projects (includes 
those where equity 
was sold more 
once) 
Value of equity 
sold (£m) 
(No. of 
transactions) 
2016 16 38 649.5 (16) 
2015 22 26 353.0 (13) 
2014 45 70 635.8 (19) 
2013 47 74 390.0 (30) 
2012 52 116 853.7 (38) 
2011 38 112 389.6 (32) 
2010 23 82 614.0 (19) 
2009 29 66 377.4 (22) 
2008 14 40  136.3   (8) 
2007 22 66 414.8 (15) 
2006 35 113 807.7 (23) 
2005 42 55 389.6 (19) 
2004 32 75 143.7 (12) 
2003 17 31 134.6   (8) 
2002 4 4 n/a 
2001 15 26 117.4   (4) 
2000 7 7 n/a 
1999 1 1 n/a 
1998 1 1 4.6   (1) 
Total 462 1,003 6,411.3 (279) 
Source: European Services Strategy Unit PPP Equity Database (2016), Whitfield (2017); n/a means 
³not available´. 
 
A sectoral analysis (see Table 2) shows that shares in health and education projects 
are the most traded, accounting for over sixty percent of the transactions. By 
comparing this to the PPP project population as a whole, where health and education 
projects account for just over 50 per cent, we can see that PPP projects in these sector 
are more popular relatively for trading equity. This may be an expression of the lower 
demand risk involved with projects in these sectors, than in some other sectors.  
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Table 2: PPP equity sales by sector (1998-2016) 
Sector Number of 
PPP projects 
in equity 
transactions 
 (includes 
those where 
equity sold 
more once) 
Percentage of 
equity 
transactions 
Total 
number of 
projects 
per sector 
(as at 
31/1216) 
Percentage 
of total 
projects 
Education    353 34.9 218 30.5 
Health  277 27.8 150 21.0 
Transport  104 10.4 68 9.5 
Criminal Justice  85 8.4 21 2.9 
Housing 30 3.0 35 4.9 
Defence 25 2.5 21 2.9 
Waste/Water 20 2.0 39 5.4 
Other 109 11.0 163 22.8 
Total 1,003 100.0 715 100.0 
Source: adapted from European Services Strategy Unit PPP Equity Database (2016); 
Whitfield (2017). 
 
 
We can also report on the time lapse between financial close of the project and the 
first equity transactions being made. The NAO (2012), while studying a sample of 
ninety nine PPP projects, found that the gap had reduced from an average of 6.72 
years in 2003-2007 to 5.89 years in the 2010-2011. Over the whole period under 
considerations (from 2003 to 2011) the NAO reported an average time gap of 6.44 
years. Using the data collected by the ESSU, which extends up to 2016, the average 
time gap was 6.47 years (Whitfield, 2017: 17). While a periodization of the ESSU time 
gap does not indicate a clear trend, the NAO (2012) numbers indicate that primary 
investors are seeking to exit projects sooner and are, therefore, finding willing 
purchasers as the market develops and matures. 
4.2 Growth of Infrastructure Funds 
It is not just the growth of transactions but also the types of organizations buying the 
equity that is relevant. Table 3 shows the number of equity transactions and PPP 
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projects involved by purchaser. While there is some trading of PPP equity among the 
primary investors (e.g. construction firms and banks), a significant tranche of public 
assets is now partly or wholly owned by infrastructure investment funds. These funds 
sole objective is a return on their investment for their members; in most cases, the 
source of this return is the future payments from the contracting public organizations 
(i.e. the public purse) rather than user charges (such as tolls).  
While some of these infrastructure funds are listed on stock exchanges, resulting in 
the necessity to comply with relevant regulations, therefore giving a certain level of 
transparency, there are examples of funds de-listing and/or moving to offshore tax 
havens or being set-up in those havens initially. For example, HICL Infrastructure, 
John Laing Infrastructure Fund and International Public Partnerships (formerly 
Babcock and Brown Public Partnerships) are all registered in the UK Crown 
Dependency of Guernsey, which is widely recognised as a tax haven (Boffey, 2017). 
This not only raises questions about tax avoidance but also makes it more difficult to 
assess the impact of decisions made by the funds, thus hampering assessments about 
performance of PPP projects.  
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Table 3: Purchasers of PPP equity 
Type of purchaser No. of 
transactions 
No. of 
PPP 
projects 
Other infrastructure fund 179 343 
Offshore infrastructure fund 145 318 
Pension fund 19 71 
Joint venture ± construction company & bank or 
pension fund 
12 69 
Other financial institution 12 17 
Construction or PPP company 57 109 
Total 424 927 
Source: European Services Strategy Unit PPP Equity Database (2016); Whitfield (2017).  
 
Further analysis shows that infrastructure investment funds have only been active in 
this secondary market since 2006, becoming the dominant purchaser of equity since 
2010 (Whitfield, 2012: 29), with all of the equity transactions in 2016 being purchases 
by off-shore infrastructure funds (Whitfield, 2017: 5).  
Despite the difficulties in collating comprehensive data on specific PPP projects, it is 
possible to illustrate some of the ways in which the ownership of public assets are 
being traded. Our first example (Table 4) shows how the equity in Calderdale Royal 
Hospital PFI has changed the ownership through both equity sales and firm takeovers, 
since financial close on 31 July 1998.  
 
Table 4: Equity trading in Calderdale Royal Hospital PFI ± about here 
 
A second example ± Barnet General Hospital (Table 5) ± shows how an offshore 
infrastructure fund can gain sole ownership of an SPC. Over a three year period, 
Barnet General Hospital became fully owned by HICL infrastructure fund. HICL had 
acquired the total equity in four transactions at a total cost of £12.3m.  
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The Barnet General Hospital PPP, renamed Metier Healthcare, recorded £10.6m pre-
tax profit in the thirteen years to 2012; on which it paid £1.3m in taxes. The company 
had a net debt of £26.5m at 31 March 2012 after taking account of £10.5m cash in the 
bank. From 2009 to 2012, Metier Healthcare paid dividends of £3.0m, in the main to 
HICL (Whitfield, 2012: 31). 
Table 5: Equity trading in Barnet General Hospital PFI ± about here 
4.3 Reported gains on equity transactions 
Following the Metier Healthcare example, Table 6 summarizes 118 transactions 
affecting 334 PPP projects where both the sale price and accounting gain made was 
disclosed.  
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Table 6: PPP equity transactions with profits data available 1998-2016 
Year Transactions No. of PPP 
projects 
Transaction 
sale price 
(£m) 
Accounting 
gain reported  
(£m) 
2016 5 16 260.1 126.2 
2015 6 10 172.9 118.1 
2014 5 7 164.4 94.9 
2013 15 21 209.8 120.9 
2012 8 45 289.8 158.4 
2011 12 29 187.2 96.8 
2010 9 31 388.6 191.5 
2009 10 41 306.0 50.4 
2008 3 8 83.1 46.3 
2007 7 33 177.6 102.7 
2006 11 36 200.8 77.3 
2005 11 14 263.3 108.5 
2004 6 16 66.8 26.3 
2003 8 20 134.6 87.3 
2002 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 6 92.5 58.5 
2000 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 
1998 1 1 3.4 4.6 
Total 118 334 3,000.9 1,468.7 
Source: European Services Strategy Unit PPP Equity Database 2016; Whitfield (2017).  
 
There is some debate about how much and whether these gains represent profiteering 
or are acceptable rates of return for the private sector partners (HM Treasury, 2007; 
NAO, 2012). This paper does not directly address those issues but seeks to raise 
questions about the robustness of the monitoring of PPP projects, when the NAO has 
an apparently ambivalent attitude to this matter in the context of the data in the above 
table and an example quoted in Whitfield (2012: 36): 
John Laing engineered the fastest profit - £6.3m in four months, net of costs. It acquired the 
remaining 50% stake in the M40 road project from Carillion in June 2004 for £19.7m and in 
October that year sold a 50% stake to the Secondary Market Infrastructure Fund for £26.3m 
(John Laing, annual report 2005). 
These claims of profiteering by SPC partners and others through the sale of PPP 
equity, is a topic that needs future research. However, it is important to recall why the 
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claims of excessive profit making are relevant. Excessive profit making would be an 
indicator that µ WKHSXEOLFVHFWRUPD\RIWHQEHSD\LQJPRUH WKDQ LVQHFHVVDU\ IRU
using equity investment (NAO, 2012: 6). In an age of perpetual austerity this 
represents public money leaking out (Shaoul, 2006) to private shareholders which 
could instead be redirected towards supporting front line services. In turn such 
leakages are an indicator that the actual performance of the PPP differs significantly 
from that planned at commencement of the project. If excessive profit-making is taking 
place this can only occur from either increased income streams or decreased costs, 
both of which have negative impacts on WKHSURMHFW¶V performance for service users 
and those working in service delivery. 
With this data in mind the next section revisits the rationales advanced to justify the 
PPP policy and expounds possible research projects based on the secondary equity 
market.  
5. Discussion  
This paper has outlined the size and scope of the burgeoning secondary market in 
PPP equity transactions. The data concerns UK-based projects as this is the largest 
and most mature of the PPP markets (Hellowell, 2013). This paper has addressed a 
previously unexplored area of PPP policy and operation, that of equity transactions. In 
the process, it has presented evidence that raises serious concerns about the 
rationales advanced to justify the use of PPPs; casting further doubt on our ability to 
measure or assess performance of such projects in the first place. The discussion 
below UHYLVLWV 6SDFNPDQ¶V  WKUHH DGGLWLRQDO UDWLRQDOHV IRU SXEOLF ERGLHV WR
engage with private finance and private actors in public infrastructure projects. There 
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is then a brief outline of potential research topics that become evident from the 
emergence of this market.  
7DNLQJ6SDFNPDQ¶Vadditional rationales in turn; first, the emergent PPP equity 
market has not, so far, allowed for greater (or better) monitoring or regulation. In fact, 
key regulatory bodies appear to have an ambivalent attitude towards it. This need not 
necessarily be the case, as the fact that such equity transactions are taking place 
means that, with relatively little effort, key information (such as price paid, size of stake 
disposed and related costs/profits) could be disclosed by sellers and purchasers. 
Crucially, this information needs to be collated and made publicly available, to ensure 
that appropriate monitoring and performance measurement mechanisms can be 
applied in pursuit of public accountability. However, it is relevant to note that the 
previous attempts to regulate ± by sharing with public sector bodies ± the gains made 
through refinancing debt, were poorly designed and implemented (Demirag et al. 
2015; Toms et al., 2011)7KHUHIRUHDVWHSFKDQJHLQJRYHUQPHQW¶VDWtitude towards 
this form of regulation is needed to control the PPP equity market. 
Second, the long-term commitment rationale for using private sector finance and 
partners does not stand up to the existence of the PPP equity market or the actual 
behaviour of primary investors. The market has developed to allow primary investors 
exit projects early. The theoretical justification for this is to allow the recycling of capital 
(NAO, 2012; Weber et al., 2016). However, we have no evidence to illustrate whether 
this is actually occurring. The NAO (2012) has shown that there is on average just six 
and a half years between financial close and equity sales. We also showed that 
primary investors are booking (often) considerable profits on disposal of their equity 
holdings. This acts as an incentive for companies to exit projects in an attempt to 
maintain earnings levels and share prices. While this motivation is consistent with the 
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work that has emerged on the financialisation of the firm (Froud et al., 2000), empirical 
studies are needed to establish the reasons behind these equity disposals by the 
primary investors and the extent to which ideas around financialization influence this 
activity (Hodge and Greve, 2018). However, it is clear from the evidence above that 
many primary private sector investors are not committed to a long-term relationship 
with public sector bodies through SPCs. If, through future studies, the recycling of 
capital thesis is found to be operating in practice, it would be more accurate to argue 
that private sector partners have an on-going series of short-term relationships with 
public sector bodies.  
Third, the development of the PPP equity market brings into question the basis of 
³ZKROH OLIH´FRVWLQJEHQHILWV,IWKHSULPDU\SDUWQHUVFDQH[LWa project after six years, 
their planning horizon no longer fits with the whole-life of a 25-30 year PPP project. As 
noted above, there is already a concern that long-term contracts reduce flexibility and 
constrains the introduction of new technologies (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010). There 
is now a real prospect that those involved with the design and negotiation of PPP 
contract specifications will not have the responsibility for delivering the contract 
service, over the majority of its term. The implications of this are currently unknown 
but are likely to include increased costs related to contract renegotiation or service 
redesign and lower of project performance (Gatti, 2018).  
The emergence of this market in PPP equity transactions also brings in to view a 
number of research-related tasks. For example, there are implications for ownership 
transparency, democratic accountability and value for money for the taxpayer, all of 
which require future research and ex post evaluations (Andon, 2012). As do the 
potential impacts on service delivery with some PPP projects becoming majority or 
wholly owned by investment funds. Further the growth of (offshore) infrastructure 
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funds also raises questions concerning tax avoidance and secrecy. While this paper 
has focused on the UK, equity transactions are taking place in PPP projects based in 
other countries, especially as supranational bodies like the IMF and World Bank are 
now advocating PPPs for developing economies (see Hodge and Greve, 2018). This 
means there is an increased scope and need for further work analyzing and comparing 
equity sales in different jurisdictions.  
Further, there is a pressing need for research into the actual (as opposed to 
prospective) rates of return and claims of profiteering by private sector partners in 
SPCs; especially as the reforms by the UK government through PF2 are geared 
towards generating more equity transactions in the future (Hellowell, 2013).  
The above future research agenda will necessarily aid the emergence of a framework 
to evaluate the performance of PPP projects. However, our argument is that if we do 
not understand the nature of (and by extension the rationales for using) PPP projects 
to procure public infrastructure assets, we will not be able to develop appropriate 
performance evaluation frameworks. Therefore, iI6SDFNPDQ¶V rationales for 
using private finance and private operators do not stand up to the emergence of the 
PPP equity market, this raises the broader question, what is the nature of PPP policy?   
We posit that a satisfactory answer to this question is unlikely to come from further 
developing more accurate or detailed rationales from existing theoretical perspectives. 
Instead we contend that there is a need to reassess the existing theorizations, 
developed to understand the reform process of public services over the past forty 
years. Further, such theorizations are unlikely to be successful if they remain single 
discipline-focussed; as Hodge et al. (2018: 9) note there has µbeen disappointingly 
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little cross-RYHU EHWZHHQ WKH GLVFLSOLQDU\ JURXSV WR GDWH¶ We outline one such a 
theorization in the final section of this paper.  
6. Conclusion 
The data and analysis in this paper has sought to provide an overview of the size and 
scope of the emergent market in PPP equity transactions. We have shown how this 
market has developed from the late 1990s covering transactions worth over Stg. £10 
billion. The market was initially composed of primary investor selling their shares to 
each other; however, from 2006 onwards infrastructure investment funds have 
established a presence becoming the dominant market actors latterly. This data is the 
empirical contribution of the paper. 
We have also sought to provide a theoretical contribution by asking what does the 
emergence of this PPP equity market tells us about the nature and rationale of using 
PPPs for public infrastructure projects? In the literature review we located this study 
in the sub-stream of work that has address the merit and worth of PPPs (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 1999; Hodge and Greve, 2008, 2018).  We noted that existing research 
KDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUXVLQJ333VDUHµHLWKHULQDGHTXDWHRUMXVWSODLQ
ZURQJ¶(Boardman and Vinnings, 2012: 119). To explore this further we followed the 
direction of argument pursued by Spackman (2002), who advanced three additional 
justifications for using private finance in PPPs ± contract monitoring, long-term 
commitment and whole-life costing. We argued that these three justifications are at 
least brought into question, if not completely undermined, by the emergence of the 
market in PPP equity. For example, if a primary private sector partner can exit a PPP 
project after six years there is clearly no long-term commitment and little incentive to 
adequately cost the project over the remainder of its life. 
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As a conclusion to this paper we sketch an interdisciplinary theorization that seeks to 
explain the emergence and nature of PPP projects, in the process setting out the basis 
for a theoretical contribution. The sketch that follows draws on public management, 
critical geography and political economy disciplines. Hodge et al. (2018) note that the 
333DJHQGDDOZD\VILWWHGLQWR1HZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQW130µOLNHDJORYH¶Following 
this logic, the question of what does NPM fit into arises? We respond by seeing NPM 
as the public management expression of the broader neoliberalization of society 
(Harvey,  2005); where neoliberalism is understood as a theory of political economy 
practices that seeks to extend market relations to every aspect of human behaviour 
(Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal reforms arose as a response to the economic crisis of the 
early 1970s and the crisis of profitability (Harvey, 2005; Roberts, 2016). In such 
circumstances, there was a need to restore profitability rates by releasing public assets 
DWOLWWOHRUQRFRVWWRWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUVRWKDWµRveraccumulated capital can seize hold 
of such assets and immediately turn them to SURILWDEOHXVH¶+DUYH\149)6.   
We therefore posit that at its deepest level of abstraction the nature of the PPP project 
is about restoring the profit rates of private sector firms. The corollary to which is that 
the rationales and motivations for PPPs that are advanced in many disciplinary 
literatures (e.g. Andon, 2012; Hodge and Greve, 2017) are actually ex post facto 
justifications. Such rationales and motivations do not provide a basis on which to build 
a performance evaluation framework for PPP projects; however, exploring the 
performance implications and priorities through the interdisciplinary theorization 
sketch outlined above, may provide a much more fruitful direction for future research.  
                                            
6
 Harvey (2003, 2005) labels this process accumulation by dispossession. 
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For example, at the project level this approach would be able to address Hodge and 
*UHYH¶V  QHZ UHVHDUFK DJHQGD TXHVWLRQ ± What are the impacts of the 
financialisation of infrastructure projects? (2018: 6) ± by drawing on the extensive 
literature on financialization from several disciplines (see Christophers, 2015; Froud 
HWDO2¶1HLOO This is a challenging conclusion to reach; however, when 
the existing justifications for a policy are shown to be inadequate or wrong, it is 
necessary to think differently about the subject matter.  
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